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Abstract—Open-ended learning allows humans and robots to 
autonomously acquire an increasingly large repertoire of skills, that 
later can allow them to produce suitable actions to achieve desirable 
effects in the environment (‘goals’). Empirical evidence from 
developmental psychology suggests that a pivotal mechanism 
possibly driving open-ended learning is represented by action-
outcome contingencies. Here we propose a specific hypothesis, 
expressed in the form of a blueprint cognitive architecture, that 
sketches the general mechanisms through which contingency-based 
open-ended learning might take place. According to this hypothesis, 
the matching (or distance) between a desired goal and the actual 
effect produced by the action can be used to drive the learning of 
both the motor skill used to accomplish the goal and the internal 
representation of the action outcome. We report here a 
computational model that implements the hypothesis and we 
illustrate two developmental psychology experiments related to the 
presented theory. Overall the model and experiments show the 
soundness of the hypothesis and represent a start towards validating 
it experimentally. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
To learn about its environment, an agent must be able to 
register the statistics that govern its sensory and motor 
behaviour. Sensory and motor statistics can be split into two 
kinds [1]. One kind of statistics might be called sensorysensory 
contingencies: these correspond to contingencies between 
perceptual events. Here however we will restrict our 
consideration to a second kind of statistics, called 
sensorimotor contingencies. These correspond to 
contingencies between motor commands and the resulting 
perceptual events. 
Developmental psychologists agree that learning must occur 
through the detection and the exploitation of sensorimotor (or 
‘action-outcome’) contingencies by the infant’s brain. Most of 
the time this idea is an implicit basis underlying more general 
and complex theories about infant development, notably 
those starting from behaviourist roots (e.g., [2]), Piaget’s 
wellknown sensorimotor approach [3], Gibson’s perspective 
on affordances [4] and the subsequent work of Von Hofsten 
[5], the Dynamic System Theory developed by Thelen and 
Smith [6], and also the recent Bayesian approach to 
development. Despite the richness of these theories there has 
been little theoretical and empirical work that directly tests 
the hypothesis of the role of sensorimotor contingencies in 
development. Some exceptions are the approaches using 
preferential looking of babies (e.g. [9]), using the so-called 
‘mobile’ paradigm (e.g. [10]) or non-nutritive sucking tests 
(e.g. [11]). There is also work looking closely at the strategies 
used to choose which sensorimotor contingencies to sample 
(e.g. [12]). Contingencies might also support the acquisition of 
motor competences in order to later achieve useful goals (e.g. 
[13]), and this might rely on mechanisms shared with other 
primates [14]. 
On the theoretical/computational side, an important thread 
of research relevant for contingency based learning involves 
the computational and robotics models of open-ended 
learning based on intrinsic motivations (IMs) [15], [16]. These 
are motivations supporting the acquisition of knowledge not 
having an immediate adaptive utility but which might become 
useful in later stages under the drive of extrinsic motivations 
supporting a direct adaptive/practical advantage [17]. This 
literature is highlighting the possibility that IMs support 
learning by working in close synergy with the detection of 
action-outcome contingencies later supporting goal-directed 
behaviour. For example, an artificial agent can learn reaching 
skills that lead to changes in the features of some objects [18], 
or learn navigation skills that cause the interaction between 
two objects [19], or can learn visual exploration routines with 
a motorised camera if they produce some effects in the 
environment [20]. 
Other relevant research threads on the computational side 
are those related to motor babbling and goal babbling. Motor 
babbling, viewing the development of structured behaviour in 
children as based on the generation of exploratory body 
movements [21], has often been used in robotics to learn 
specific tasks rather than for open-ended learning (e.g., [22], 
[23]). Instead, another view posits that behaviour is always 
goaloriented since its early development [24]. Along this line, 
 in the computational literature goal babbling [25], [26] has 
been proposed to support the learning of multiple tasks. 
However, these tasks still belong to specific categories that 
have to be established beforehand by the researcher (e.g., 
‘reaching’ goals/tasks). Moreover, they do not face the 
problem requiring the agent to disentangle the effects 
produced by the agent’s action from those happening for 
other causes, such as the environment dynamics or other 
agents [20], [27]. 
Instead, we conjecture that contingency-based learning 
encompasses general mechanisms able to: (a) support the 
selfgeneration of goals, and learning of actions, of any type 
and at any scale; (2) overcome the problem of disentangling 
the effects produced by the agent’s actions from those 
happening for other causes. These issues are expanded in this 
paper only at the theoretical level while the computational 
model we present here focusses on developing some detailed 
mechanisms showing how contingency-based learning can 
actually work in practice. To this purpose we focus on one class 
of tasks (reaching body parts) and do not face the issue of 
agency with the model. The issue of the generality of 
contingency-based learning with respect to goal/action types 
and scale, and the issue of agency, will be faced with future 
models. These issues are a main motivation for this research 
and the reason why we think contingency-based learning 
might be so important for autonomous open-ended learning. 
Regarding the mechanisms on which contingency-based 
learning might rely, we posit in essence that it has at its core 
some events internal to the agent and reflecting the 
sensorimotor contingencies happening in the environment. 
Each of these events is in particular a match between the 
perceived outcome deriving from action execution and the 
selected goal that produced the action that caused the 
outcome. This match signal plays a crucial importance as it 
supports the selection of the goal on which to focus learning 
resources and guides the both learning of the outcome 
representation (later possibly becoming a ‘goal’ when 
activated by internal processes), and the refinement of the 
action producing the outcome. 
A first contribution of this work is the presentation of a 
blueprint architecture, usable to guide the design of specific 
computational models and empirical experiments, directed to 
capture the key elements of contingency-based learning (Sec. 
II). A second contribution is an illustration of how the blueprint 
architecture can guide the construction of specific 
computational models: this is done by overviewing a model 
illustrated in detail in a companion paper [28] (Sec. III). The last 
two contributions are the proposal of two developmental 
psychology experiments (Sec. IV) that provide initial 
experimental data in line with the presented theory. The first 
experiment (Sec.IV-A) tests the very basis of the hypothesis, 
namely that infants are indeed sensitive to sensorimotor 
contingencies. The second experiment (Sec. IV-B), closely 
linked to the computational model, involves placing a small 
buzzer on the body of a baby to see if this triggers exploration 
behaviour directed to it. Sec. V draws the conclusions. 
II. THE ACTION-OUTCOME CONTINGENCY HYPOTHESIS AND THE BLUEPRINT 
ARCHITECTURE 
The sensory-motor contingency hypothesis presented here 
states that the agent learns to map both sensory input related 
 
Fig. 1. The blueprint architecture incorporating our hypothesis about the 
mechanisms underlying open-ended learning of multiple skills. Numbers: 
sequence of processes happening in one trial of functioning of the system. 
to the environment states following action execution 
(outcomes), and the motor behaviour corresponding to the 
actions, onto a common internal representational space 
(contingency space). Activation patterns within this common 
space can be triggered both by the sensory input 
corresponding to the action-outcomes or by internal 
mechanisms (goals) causing the performance of actions. When 
a correspondence between goals and encoded outcomes takes 
place within the contingency space (matching) the agent self-
generates a feedback signalling that an action-outcome 
contingency between the performed action and the resulting 
outcome in the environment has taken place. The agent can 
then compute an estimation of the occurrence of the matching 
and use it to recursively improve the mapping between the 
sensory input and the encoded action-outcomes as well as the 
mapping between the goals and the corresponding motor 
behaviours. 
The blueprint architecture incorporating our hypothesis on 
the possible mechanisms underlying contingency-based 
openended learning is sketched in Fig. 1. The architecture 
pivots on these key elements (the numbers in the figure refer 
to the architecture processes commented below, but they are 
also used here to indicate its main elements): (a) Contingency 
space: a pre-wired space which can be discrete or continuous 
(see number 1 in Fig. 1); (b) Goals: internally activated points 
in the contingency space (number 1); (c) Skill mapping: 
mapping from goals to actions (number 3); (d) Actions: 
behaviour chunks encoded by parameter sets forming points 
of an action space (number 4); (e) Percepts: activations of 
sensors corresponding to action outcomes and forming points 
 of a perceptual space (number 6); (f) Perception mapping: 
mapping from percepts to outcomes, which are encoded in the 
contingency space (number 7); (g) Outcomes: effects of actions 
in the environment (number 5), and points in the contingency 
space encoding them (number 1). 
We now first illustrate the functioning of this architecture, 
and then its learning processes. The architecture life is divided 
in trials. For each trial, the following processes take place (see 
Fig. 1, numbers in hexagons): (1) The contingency space exists 
before any learning process, so initially it does not have any 
semantics; (2) At the beginning of each trial the agent selects 
and activates a goal in the contingency space on the basis of a 
certain probability distribution; (3) The skill mapping, 
randomly initialised, activates an action; (4) The action is 
performed in the environment; (5) As an effect of this, the 
environment returns a percept to the agent (action-outcome); 
(6) The percept is encoded as a point in the perceptual space; 
(7) The point in the perceptual space is mapped into a point in 
the contingency space, the outcome representation; (8) The 
outcome representation can match the goal or not (if the 
contingency space is discrete), or have a certain degree of 
similarity with it (continuous contingency space). The 
matching value for each goal can be used to determine the 
probability distribution over the goals that allows the agent to 
select goals on which to focus learning (number 2), for 
example to select goals for which the competence is low or for 
which the competence-improvement rate is high. 
Regarding the learning processes, the goal-outcome 
match/mismatch or similarity level (matching) can be 
considered as a measure of the agent’s competence, i.e. of its 
capacity to achieve the selected goal based on the performed 
action. The matching can be used as a learning signal to drive 
the learning processes involving the perceptual and skill 
mappings. In particular, a successful matching (i.e., a goal-
outcome correspondence, or a small distance between goal 
and outcome) can be used as a reward to adjust the action by 
reinforcement learning and then to correct the skill mapping. 
Moreover, the matching signal can also be used to adjust the 
perceptual mapping so that the outcome matches, or becomes 
more similar, to the goal. Through these learning processes the 
contingency space gradually acquires a double semantics. On 
the skill side, each goal maps to an action, hence acquiring the 
valence of a ‘motor pointer’ that allows the agent to trigger 
suitable actions to accomplish selected goals. On the 
perceptual side, a goal corresponds to a certain percept 
representing the world state that the agent desires to 
accomplish when the goal is selected. 
Through these processes, the agent discovers as many as 
possible outcome states it can produce with its behaviour in 
the current environment, learns to encode them into the 
preexisting contingency space, and acquires the motor 
capabilities needed to accomplish such outcomes when 
desired (by forming a representation of them and then by 
internally activating them as goals). 
Based on this overview of our hypothesis, it is now possible 
to go back to the statement proposed in the introduction 
about the generality of contingency-based learning. First, the 
mechanism supports the learning of any type of action-
outcome (goal) and action (see [29] for the problem of learning 
any type of outcome). The reason is that both outcomes and 
actions are encoded and projected onto the contingency space 
which is neutral with respect to the particular nature and 
encoding of outcomes and actions. For the same reason, 
potentially the mechanism might also be used to tackle 
outcomes and actions at different scales of space/time 
abstraction, e.g. from ‘driving the arm to a certain posture’ to 
‘getting a PhD’. This issue might however possibly require the 
specialisation of different regions of the contingency space to 
encode and process knowledge related to different levels of 
abstraction. Contingency-based leaning might also allow the 
agent to distinguish between the effects it can cause with own 
action from those happening for other reasons, such as the 
environment dynamics or other agents. The key mechanism 
for the attribution of causality to own action with respect to a 
certain outcome can be summarised by the formula p(O|A) − 
p(O|¬A) > 0 where p indicates a probability, O the outcomes, 
A the action, and ¬ the negation [7]. To check causality, the 
blue-print architecture described above could be expanded 
with a mechanism that checks the presence of own action 
causality by (a) selecting a goal, (b) checking the probability of 
the presence of its related world state in absence of action 
(p(O|¬A)); this is a first element to add to the architecture), (c) 
perform the action to check its relation with the outcome 
(p(O|A)) based on the matching mechanisms, and then (d) 
compare p(O|A) and p(O|¬A) (a second element to add to the 
architecture). These issues related to the generality of the 
contingency-based mechanism, considered here only at this 
theoretical level, should be further investigated with specific 
computational models in future work. 
III. COMPUTATIONAL MODEL 
The computational model, designed to study the 
developmental experiment reported in Sec. IV-B, aims to 
reproduce the learning processes of a baby that autonomously 
learns goals and actions to reach and touch parts of its own 
body surface. For lack of space, here we describe the model at 
a high level which is however enough to indicate a possible 
way in which the hypothesis incorporated in the blueprint 
architecture can be implemented into a specific model. 
Further details on the system can be found in the companion 
paper [28]. 
The baby’s body is simulated in a simplified way with a 
custom simulator reproducing an agent with two 2D 3DoF 
kinematic arms and a torso (Fig. 2). The life of the system is 
divided into trials. During a trial, the agent performs an action 
by setting a sequence of desired postures of the arms: the 
simulator brings the arms to those postures through standard 
proportional-derivative controllers. The simulator also 
 implements 30 touch sensors distributed over the agent’s 
body that activate when touched by one of the two ‘hands’ of 
the agent. The activation patterns of these sensors are the 
outcome states resulting from the execution of the agent’s 
actions and are taken as input by the model. 
The first component of the model, the Outcome Encoder, 
encodes sensory touch inputs by clustering them through a 
self-organising map (SOM; [30]). This clustering serves 
multiple purposes: (a) reduce the complexity, in particular the 
dimensionality, of the input space; (b) create similar internal 
representations to similar inputs; (c) make the system general 
with respect to the input modalities (e.g., vision might be 
added to touch); (d) create a discrete representation of the 
formed clusters that allow the later selection of one (discrete) 
 
Fig. 2. Architecture of the computational model representing a first 
implementation of the blueprint architecture hypothesis. The red dotted 
arrows indicate which component is affected by the competence-based 
modulation signal during learning. The parallel segments indicate a 
correspondence between the units of the Outcome Encoder and those of the 
Goal Selector. 
goal. The output layer of the SOM is formed by units (here 25) 
mapping one-to-one to those of the second component of the 
system, the Goal Selector, and together they form the 
contingency space. The Goal Selector selects one of its units, 
encoding a goal, on the basis of a softmax function taking as 
input a measure of the agent’s competence for that goal and 
generating as output a probability distribution over the 
(discrete) goal representations. The units selected in the Goal 
Selector triggers a different motor command if selected. The 
goal selection process based on intrinsic motivations might 
work aside other processes for goal selection based on 
extrinsic motivations [31]. 
The selected goal activates an action performed in the 
environment. This is based on a Motor Controller component 
formed by an echo-state neural network [32]. In particular, the 
output pattern of the Goal Selector is fed into the echo-state 
network thus biasing its dynamics and causing it to perform a 
certain action (the read-out layer of the echo-state network is 
mapped into the arm angles to produce a movement 
trajectory). The goal fed into the echo-state network is 
represented through a filter based on radial-basis functions (as 
usual, these are Gaussian functions that are activated on the 
basis of the distance of the selected goal from the equidistant 
centres of the functions). This would allow the system to 
interpolate between goals but the current selection of goals, 
based on a localistic representations goals, should be 
substituted by one using a continuous representation. 
Another component of the system is formed by a 
Competence module computing the competence of the agent 
for the different goals. This component is formed by a linear 
neural network that learns to predict the action-outcome 
contingency success (0/1 event: Match signal) related to the 
selected goal. A contingency success happens when the 
Encoder and the Goal Selector, that have corresponding units, 
have the same activation pattern, meaning that the goal 
(desired outcome) was successfully accomplished. The error 
between the matching signal and the Predictor output is used 
to compute the competence level for the selected goal 
(intrinsic motivation; [33]). The competence measure is used 
as input to the Goal Selector to select goals with low 
competence. Given the problem faced, which involves 
deterministic outcomes and an a-priori knowledge on the 
maximum achievable performance level (100%), we can use 
here an IM mechanism based on competence level rather than 
improvement [34], [35]. 
Competence also modulates the learning of both the 
Outcome Encoder and the Motor Controller. The Outcome 
Encoder learns to encode the perceived outcomes into clusters 
using the standard algorithms of SOMs [30]. However, this 
learning process progressively slows down for the goals 
reaching a higher competence: this protects them against 
unlearning due to the learning of other goal representations. 
The Motor Controller learns to perform the correct action by 
reinforcement learning [36], in particular by storing successful 
final arm postures leading to a successful matching and by 
using such postures to train the read-out layer of the echostate 
network with a standard supervised learning algorithm [32]. 
Also this learning process progressively slows down for the 
goals that reach a higher competence, thus protecting the 
acquired motor skills. 
Initially, the activations of the Encoder and Goal generator 
have a low chance of matching, since the perceptual cluster 
prototypes and the motor actions have not yet been acquired. 
With learning, by making use of the agent’s competence-based 
signals, both sensory clusters and actions become increasingly 
accurate. The key drive of learning is the matching that signals 
that a contingency has been detected. This contingency in 
particular involves the activation of a specific goal that triggers 
the performance of the corresponding action, and this action 
causes the perception of an outcome – a body touch sensation 
– belonging to the sensory cluster that corresponds to the goal. 
All learning processes are performed at each step with the 
exception of the Goal Predictor that learns at the end of each 
trial based on the goal chosen at the beginning of the trial and 
on the matching at the end of the trial. Learning lasts for 8000 
 trials and each trial ends either with a goal-matching or after a 
timeout of 100 steps. 
The test of the system show that with learning the Outcome 
Encoder and the Motor Controller converge to an equilibrium 
where they are closely coupled and the agent manages to 
accomplish each discovered goal with maximum probability 
(Fig. 3). In particular, during learning the system tends to 
repeatedly focus for brief periods of time on different goals 
and actions until it converges on a stable configuration of 
them. 
At the end of learning, the experienced sensory patterns 
corresponding to the perceived outcomes are suitably 
clustered and mapped into the contingency space (Fig. 4), and 
the points corresponding to them within this space are 
mapped into the (parameters of) actions able to achieve those 
outcomes when desired, thus leading to a goal-action-
outcome alignment. 
Behaviourally, with learning the agent becomes 
progressively able to produce the actions that lead to 
successfully accomplish the postures corresponding to the 
encoded outcomes/goals. This is demonstrated by the fact 
that after learning if the goal-units of the Goal Selector are 
externally 
Fig. 4. Activation of sensors corresponding to the outcomes and goals of the 
learned actions. x-axis: body sensors; y-axis: each graph in each row, 
corresponding to one goal of the SOM, shows the activation level of the 30 
body sensors (rows are vertically organised in order of position of the 
maximum sensor activation from left to right). 
activated one after the other, the system produces postures 
that lead the agent to touch different parts of its body (Fig. 5). 
Note that in this test the goal units can be thought of as 
 
Fig. 3. History of goal competence, measured as the estimate of the Competence component of the selected goal success, plotted over the learning process. 
Top plot: the black line indicates the average estimate over all 25 goals, the dark gray shadow indicates the standard deviation, and the light gray shadow 
indicates the worst and best goal/action; the raster plot in the upper part of the graph shows the matching events for each goal, where different rows correspond 
to different goals. Bottom plots: zoom of respectively the initial phase and convergence phase of the learning process. 
 
 representing extrinsic goals that are activated, say, by a 
particular need of the agent, for example to reach a particular 
portion of body to remove a buzzer located on it, as illustrated 
in the empirical experiments in Sec. IV-B. 
Fig. 5. Postures corresponding to goals self-generated by the system and 
leading the system to touch different parts of its own body. 
IV. THE DEVELOPMENTAL PSYCHOLOGY EXPERIMENTS 
In order to start to evaluate whether human babies use the 
type of learning mechanisms described in the previous 
sections, we first looked to see whether we could demonstrate 
that babies really are sensitive to sensorimotor contingencies. 
In a second investigation we checked whether 
contingencybased learning of body structure could be 
accelerated by increasing the amount of tactile stimulation 
that an infant receives. This is what would be predicted from 
the model, since greater experience with self-touch should 
facilitate the agent’s subsequent ability to reach to a location 
on the body when this becomes a goal. 
A. The contingency experiment 
 
Fig. 6. (A) An 8-month-old infant wearing a bracelet around each wrist. (B) 
Screenshot of the visual stimulus used. When the infant moved one of its arms, 
the smiley face moved with speed proportional to the mean acceleration of 
the infant’s arm, changing direction randomly. 
In this experiment we equipped babies (aged 4 to 8 months) 
with bluetooth-enabled bracelets on their wrists that 
generated a bell sound coupled with movement of a smiley 
face on the screen, when the infant moved one of its arms (see 
Fig. 6). For comparison with these ‘contingent’ infants, we also 
had a control group of ‘non-contingent’ infants who were 
given equivalent audio and visual stimulation, but that was 
independent of their movements. 
We found that, over the 4 minute period of the experiment, 
infants’ arm activity gradually increased, presumably because 
the infants became excited by the stimulation. However, 
infants for whom stimulation was contingent on their 
movements increased their activity more strongly than infants 
where this was not the case (4 and 6 month olds in Fig. 7). 
Globally, these results show that infants are sensitive to the 
sensorimotor contingency linking the arm actions to the smiley 
motion. Curiously however, we did not find this sensitivity for 
infants aged 8 months. This surprising result might be 
explained by supposing that at 8 months of age, infants are 
already too old to be interested in our simple contingency. We 
could obviously test this in the future by further experiments 
on even older infants. Another interesting result was that 
infants at all ages seemed not to be able to discover which of 
the two arms is causing the contingent effect (result not shown 
in the graphs). We are pursuing further work with more salient 
contingencies to try to elucidate this surprising negative 
finding. 
B. The buzzer experiment 
If, as suggested by the model presented above, infants 
acquire body know-how through exploration of tactile events, 
then the more opportunities they have to do so, the earlier 
they should later be able to rely on this know-how to actually 
reach for touched locations on their bodies. In order to explore 
this hypothesis experimentally we designed a longitudinal 
study to follow the development of infants that received 
regular non-social tactile stimulation on their body (tactile 
stimulation condition) and compared the development of their 
ability to localize touch on their body to the development of 
infants in a control group that did not receive regular tactile 
stimulation. Infants in the tactile stimulation condition were 
not actually trained to reach stimulated areas as movements 
oriented towards the buzzer were not rewarded or reinforced 
externally (as opposed to earlier studies, where infants’ 
movements were reinforced by the movement of a mobile 
above their head, see for instance: Watanabe and Taga, 2009). 
Infants in this group merely had the opportunity to explore the 
effect of tactile stimulation on their body and thus learn about 
their body structure through self-touch. 
We visited infants both groups of infants weekly in their 
homes during the period when the infants were 4 to 7 months 
of age. In the tactile stimulation condition, each visit consisted 
of a tactile stimulation session in which buzzers were attached 
for about 30 seconds to the infant’s hands, feet, knees and 
abdomen, one body part at a time (Fig. 8 ). In the control 
condition, infants received identical sessions with the only 
difference that the experimenter did not actually attach the 
buzzers to their bodies, only approached the infants with the 
buzzer. With this design, we controlled for the effect of the 
mere presence of the experimenter. Ten infants were followed 
longitudinally in each group. 
Our preliminary results confirm our expectations from the 
model. Starting from age 6 months, infants who received 
weekly tactile stimulation were better able to reach for the 
buzzers than the infants who had no stimulation and this 
difference became significant by 7 months (Fig. 9). 
V. CONCLUSIONS 
The first contribution of this work was to propose, in the 
form of a blueprint architecture, a hypothesis on 
contingencybased mechanisms possibly underlying open-
ended learning of multiple goals and actions. According to the 
 hypothesis, such learning can rely on a contingency space that 
progressively comes to encode at the same time: goals, that 
when activated trigger the performance of certain actions, and 
sensory outcomes, resulting from the performance of those 
actions. The hypothesis also states that the selection of the 
goals, and the learning of the two mappings from the outcome 
sensations to the contingency space and from this space to the 
actions, can be guided by a competence signal computed on 
the basis of the internal detection of the contingency. This 
internal contingency corresponds to the fact that a selected 
goal, represented in the contingency space, triggers the 
performance of an action that causes an outcome in the 
environment that has an internal representation, within the 
same contingency space, that matches the goal. 
We have here presented a first implementation of this 
hypothesis using a specific computational model. The model 
uses a self-organising map (SOM) to encode the sensations 
produced by actions and an echo-state network to produce 
actions. The discrete contingency space of the system is 
represented by the output layer of the SOM mirrored by a 
layer of units representing goals selected with a probability 
distribution based on the competence to achieve those goals. 
Mean of  
6 month-old 
infants 
Intergroup 
comparison 
Fig. 7. Activity of infants’ arms (measured in multiples of earth’s acceleration g) over the 4 minutes of the experiment, for the contingent and non-contingent 
groups at 4, 6 and 8 months of age. The error bars represent one standard error on either side of the mean. The ANOVA shows that the slopes of the blue 
(contingent) lines differs significantly from that of the red (non-contingent) lines for the 4 and 6 month old infants. 
 
Fig. 8. (Left) A 6-month-old infant collecting a small ‘buzzer’ (a vibrotactile 
target, indicated by the yellow arrow) from her right foot during test. (Right) 
Illustration of the buzzer and the locations stimulated in the ’tactile 
stimulation’ group. 
The matching between the selected goal and the actually 
experienced sensorial action-outcome is used to compute a 
measure of competence which is in turn used to train the 
encoding of action-outcomes and of the motor actions. 
Although preliminary, the tests of the model demonstrate the 
computational viability of the proposed hypothesis. 
The two empirical experiments presented here represented 
first steps towards making a close link between the 
computational hypothesis and actual infant behaviour. 
Unfortunately in our first experiment, which was designed to 
test the very basis of our hypothesis, namely that 
sensorimotor contingencies can drive learning in infants, we 
found it much more difficult than 
  
Fig. 9. Ability of infants to reach for buzzers for the experimental (who received 
weekly tactile stimulation with the buzzer) and control groups at 5, 6 and 7 
months of age (n=10 in each group). The error bars represent one standard 
error on either side of the mean. 
expected to find a clear evidence. We are now pursuing further 
work to improve the paradigm by making the stimuli more 
salient and the baby more attentive. 
The second experiment was also a first attempt to test what 
would seem like an obvious prediction of the model, namely 
that goals (in this case buzzer locations) would be more easily 
attained if prior self-touch experiences had sensitized the 
particular locations stimulated, thus facilitating 
contingencybased learning. We did indeed confirm this 
prediction. However such a prediction would probably also be 
made by any reasonable model of sensorimotor learning. Our 
future work will hence involve finding more precise predictions 
of the model that would differentiate it from other possible 
models – in particular from models which do not make use of 
the notion of ‘goal’. We will then attempt to find a refinement 
of our experimental paradigm with buzzers in order to test 
such more critical predictions. 
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